Iran’s current wave of unrest highlights the tension between state sovereignty and global human rights governance in an increasingly interconnected world. Protests, riots and strikes have spread across the country, driven by economic collapse, political repression and anger at the Islamic Republic’s unaccountable system. The state response has been extreme. Human rights organisations estimate that several thousand people may have been killed, with figures up to 12,000 often cited, while Iranian authorities report far lower numbers and deny systematic violence. Verification is difficult because of internet shutdowns, military elements on the street, media censorship and intimidation of victims’ families.
Economic hardship was the immediate trigger. Inflation has remained high for years, the currency has sharply devalued, and sanctions have reduced access to jobs, medicine and investment. As in protest waves in 2009 (rigged elections), 2019 (economic discontent) and 2022 (the murder of Mahsa Amini), demonstrations that began over specific issues quickly became much broader. This reflects the impact of cultural globalisation. Despite heavy censorship, Iranians are exposed to democratic and liberal ideas through social media platforms, satellite television, VPNs and Iranian diaspora networks based in Europe and North America. Protest slogans and demands show clear influence from global movements focused on women’s rights, freedom of expression and accountable government. Large diaspora protests in cities such as London, Berlin and Toronto reinforce these ideas internationally, even if they cannot directly shape events inside Iran.
Iran’s political system is best described as authoritarian or non-democratic. While elections exist and the country is nominally democratic, the Vilayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) doctrine means that it is ultimately the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) that exercise power in practise. This structure helps explain the regime’s reliance on repression. Democratic peace theory argues that democracies are less likely to use violence against their own citizens and less likely to fight one another. Iran’s authoritarianism increases the likelihood of internal repression and external confrontation, contributing to its reputation as a rogue state that operates outside liberal democratic norms. Persistent unrest and mass killings also raise questions about state failure. While Iran is not a failed state, repeated crises weaken legitimacy, strain institutions and increase the risk of long-term instability.
International responses highlight the limited influence of human rights organisations when confronted with state sovereignty. Groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, alongside UN special rapporteurs and the UN Human Rights Council, have documented killings, arbitrary arrests and executions. However, these bodies lack enforcement power. Iran has refused cooperation and dismissed criticism as foreign interference. This demonstrates a key issue in global politics: human rights norms exist, but states retain control over force within their borders. When regime survival is at stake, international law and moral pressure have limited effect.
Political globalisation and global political governance are also visible through sanctions. The United States, the European Union and other actors have imposed collective economic and diplomatic sanctions in response to Iran’s nuclear programme and human rights abuses. These measures aim to change behaviour through joint pressure, reflecting liberal ideas about international cooperation and rule-based order. In practice, sanctions have worsened living conditions for ordinary Iranians while failing to produce significant political reform. This has intensified domestic anger and highlights a major criticism of liberal approaches to global governance. In addition, the USA has implemented unilateral sanctions of 25% on any country trading with Iran (for example, leading to India virtually suspending its rice exports to Iran). This further shows that states may act alone to exert economic pressure, in their self-interest. From a realist perspective, the behaviour of states around Iran reflects security and power concerns rather than moral values. Israel and the United States prioritise deterrence and balance of power. Human rights matter rhetorically, but realism and security better explain state behaviour.
Iran’s internal crisis cannot be separated from its regional ambitions. For decades, Iran sought to act as a regional great power by projecting influence through proxy groups. It has supported Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. It also intermittently pursued the creation of a nuclear deterrent despite international sanctions. This strategy allowed Iran to challenge rivals such as Israel and Saudi Arabia while avoiding direct war. However, it relied heavily on hard power, deterrence and military networks. The 2025 conflict with Israel, involving Israeli strikes and US involvement, exposed the limits of this approach. Iranian military capabilities and regional credibility were damaged, showing how quickly years of investment could be undermined. This shows one of the inherent risks of utilising hard power; it may lead to an unpredictable and critically damaging backlash from other states who fear for their security.
Looking ahead, several outcomes are possible, each with serious implications for international relations. The regime may survive again by relying on violence, surveillance and fear, allowing the state to limp on despite deep instability. This would support realist assumptions about authoritarian resilience and the limits of international pressure. A more dangerous outcome is partial state failure. If unrest continues, if security forces fracture, if there is a substantial US-Israeli military intervention, or if ethnic and regional tensions intensify, Iran could face prolonged internal conflict. This would destabilise the Middle East, disrupt energy markets and increase refugee flows. The danger posed by the collapse of the Iranian state is illustrative of realist logic that sovereign states stand between order and anarchy, and explains why Gulf states like Saudi Arabia who are traditionally rivals of Iran, are keen to avoid an escalation to full-scale war which might trigger state failure.
Foreign “humanitarian” intervention carries major risks. Humanitarian intervention to protect civilians might be justified on moral grounds, but it would violate sovereignty, risk escalation and could provoke wider war. Israeli or US intervention could also strengthen the regime domestically by framing unrest as foreign aggression. Many Western actors and diaspora networks have spoken of a restoration of the Pahlavi monarchy that was overthrown by the Islamic Revolution in 1979; while Iran’s current regime is unpopular, Reza Pahlavi, the Shah in exile, has little credibility and would undermine the viability of anti-regime protests.