3.1 – The state and globalisation
3.4 – Power and developments
3.6 – Comparative theories
As the deadline for promised escalation approached in April 2026, President Trump retreated from earlier maximalist rhetoric and accepted a ceasefire with Iran (however, it is unclear whether the ceasefire extends to cover Israel and the front of the war in Lebanon). This followed public threats to “end Iranian civilisation,” language that signals a marked erosion of the norms-based discourse of rights in international politics. Such statements can be interpreted as, at minimum, an admission of intent to commit war crimes through indiscriminate force, and at worst as genocidal in implication. The subsequent agreement therefore reflects not a position of dominance, but a recalibration under domestic and international constraints.
The ceasefire has immediately reduced direct confrontation between the USA and Iran, yet it leaves core strategic questions unresolved. Iranian policymakers have little incentive to accept a permanent settlement without substantial concessions, particularly the withdrawal of US military assets from the Gulf. The USA maintains a dense network of bases across Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, alongside carrier strike groups operating in adjacent waters. These deployments underpin US power projection but also constitute high-value targets. Iran’s missile arsenal, including medium-range ballistic systems, anti-ship missiles and drone swarms, provides credible means to threaten these installations. Under such conditions, a durable ceasefire would require structural changes to the regional military balance that Washington is unlikely to accept.
Lebanon remains the most immediate arena of instability for the ceasefire. Israeli operations against Hezbollah have continued at high intensity, raising serious concerns regarding compliance with international humanitarian law. On 9 April alone, Israeli airstrikes reportedly targeted multiple sites across southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, including urban districts and transport corridors, killing hundreds of civilians in Beirut in a wave of extensive bombings on 8 April alone. Since early April, total fatalities have exceeded 500, with extensive damage to roads, power infrastructure and residential areas. The scale and pattern of strikes, particularly in densely populated zones, have prompted allegations of disproportionate use of force and potential violations of human rights norms in the manner of a “rogue state”. Hezbollah has responded with sustained, though lower-intensity, rocket fire into northern Israel, numbering in the hundreds of projectiles. These exchanges illustrate the limits of state-centric agreements. Hezbollah operates as a non-state actor embedded within Iran’s regional strategy and is not directly bound by the ceasefire, while Israeli actions both degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and perpetuate the cycle of retaliation.
Iran’s leverage is further amplified through the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 17 to 20 million barrels of oil per day historically transited the strait, representing around 20 percent of global supply. Since the escalation, flows have at times fallen below 6 million barrels per day. War risk insurance premiums have increased by more than 300 percent, and some shipping has been diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, extending transit times by up to two weeks. Oil prices have fluctuated between 95 and 105 US dollars per barrel. These disruptions highlight the dynamics of economic globalisation, in which regional instability produces immediate global economic consequences. Iran does not need to close the strait entirely; the credible threat of disruption is sufficient to generate systemic effects. By selectively maintaining exports to aligned or neutral partners while constraining flows to adversaries, Iran has been able to sustain revenue while imposing significant costs on its opponents.
The situation exposes clear limits to US hard power. Despite extensive strikes on Iranian military and nuclear-linked infrastructure, the USA has failed to achieve key objectives. Regime change has not occurred, and external pressure has instead reinforced internal cohesion within Iran. Efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear programme have also proven ineffective. Proposed operations against hardened facilities, including those near Isfahan, were constrained by advanced Iranian air defence systems, with reports of US aircraft losses and aborted missions highlighting operational limits deep within enemy territory. Similarly, the USA has been unable to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian use fast attack craft, drones and missile saturation, and the threat of mining the waters, continues to deter normal shipping volumes, demonstrating the vulnerability of even superior naval forces in confined and contested environments.
These outcomes indicate a broader shift in global power. The USA retains unmatched aggregate capabilities but faces increasing constraints in their application. In contrast, China has emerged as a relative beneficiary. Beijing has avoided direct involvement while continuing to secure energy supplies, often at discounted rates, and presenting itself diplomatically as a more responsible and neutral actor seeking to resolve the conflict. This enhances China’s position within global markets and strengthens its influence among states seeking alternatives to US-led security frameworks.
From a theoretical perspective, the ceasefire aligns with realist expectations. States prioritise security, mistrust persists, and agreements remain temporary in the absence of resolved power competition. Liberal interpretations emphasise diplomacy and interdependence, yet weak enforcement mechanisms and ongoing violations limit their explanatory power.