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3.1 - The State and Globalisation3.4 - Power and Developments3.5 - EU and Regionalism3.6 - Comparative TheoriesGlobal Politics

What does Hungary’s election tell us about the future of the EU and globalisation?

3.1 – The state and globalisation

3.4 – Power and developments

3.5 – Regionalism and the EU

3.6 – Comparative theories

 

Hungary’s recent election saw Péter Magyar’s Tisza party secure a parliamentary supermajority, ending the 16-year rule of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz. Magyar has indicated that a new cabinet will be formed by mid-May, with a policy agenda focused on restoring judicial independence, reforming media regulation, and improving relations with Brussels. This outcome is significant both for Hungary’s domestic political trajectory and for the broader balance between national sovereignty and supranational integration within the European Union.

Over the past decade, Orbán emerged as one of Europe’s most prominent advocates of a nationalist, sovereigntist model. His governments framed EU pressure, particularly on migration, rule of law, media pluralism, and civil society, as “culturally liberal” interference. However, this strategy imposed clear economic and political costs. Approximately €10 billion in EU recovery funds remain frozen due to rule-of-law disputes, and financial markets responded positively to Orbán’s defeat. Hungarian equities rose and investor sentiment improved, reflecting expectations of more stable governance and renewed access to EU funding.

This case illustrates how regional organisations can constrain state sovereignty without formally removing it. Hungary remained legally sovereign under Orbán, yet its economic position – access to capital, recovery funds, and market confidence – was closely tied to compliance with EU norms. Sovereignty in this context is therefore conditional and exercised within a framework of institutional interdependence. Orbán retained the capacity to veto and obstruct EU initiatives, but such actions carried fiscal and reputational consequences.

At the same time, the election does not indicate a straightforward rejection of nationalism. Magyar is expected to adopt a more cooperative stance toward the EU and to reverse elements of democratic backsliding. However, his political positioning reflects continuity as well as change. As a former Fidesz member, he is likely to maintain more assertive positions on issues such as migration. This suggests that voters did not abandon nationalist preferences entirely; rather, they responded to concerns over corruption, media control, and economic management, which had undermined the perceived effectiveness of Orbán’s model.

The broader implications for the EU are therefore incremental rather than transformative. Hungary may become less obstructive in areas such as rule-of-law disputes and collective policymaking, including support for Ukraine, where Orbán had previously vetoed major financial packages. Nonetheless, the durability of “Orbánism” should not be underestimated. It is embedded not only ideologically but institutionally, through networks of political influence and state control. As a result, Magyar is likely to encounter resistance within key state bodies as he attempts constitutional and institutional reform.

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