Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of imprisoned former President Jair Bolsonaro, won 47.03% of valid votes in Brazil’s first presidential round, ahead of the left-wing candidate and incumbent President Lula. The result positions him strongly for the run-off election later in October and increases the likelihood of a substantial change in Brazil’s approach to environmental governance, multilateralism and regional cooperation.
The sharpest change could concern global environmental governance. Bolsonaro promises to end illegal deforestation by 2029 but has also pledged to remove environmental “constraints”, centralise licensing within the presidency, permit fracking and halt further demarcation of indigenous territory. A right-wing-dominated Congress could help weaken licensing requirements, reduce protected areas and permit mining on indigenous land. This could undermine Brazil’s Paris Agreement commitments and the agreements reached at COP30, hosted in Belém, Brazil. Since Brazil controls most of the Amazon Rainforest, its domestic land-use policy directly affects the credibility of global climate governance.
Brazilian participation in other institutions could become narrower and more transactional. Lula has used BRICS, climate diplomacy and Global South institutions to increase Brazil’s agenda-setting influence. Bolsonaro favours closer relations with the USA and opposes BRICS proposals to reduce dependence on the dollar. Bolsonaro has also proposed freeing Brazil from Mercosur’s restrictions so that it can negotiate bilateral agreements, potentially following Javier Milei’s Argentina towards closer relations with the USA. This might accelerate individual trade deals but would weaken Mercosur’s collective bargaining power. Brazil accounts for roughly 31% of Latin American and Caribbean GDP, so its retreat from regional institution-building would limit the region’s ability to operate as an independent pole.
Closer alignment with Washington under a Bolsonaro presidency would, however, not necessarily move Brazil towards great-power status. Cooperation over investment, defence and critical minerals could increase its material capabilities. However, Brazil’s influence has traditionally rested on strategic autonomy: maintaining relations with the USA while trading extensively with China and representing the Global South. China remains Brazil’s largest trading partner. Abandoning this hedging strategy could reduce Brazil’s diplomatic independence and soft power, turning it into a supporter of American policy rather than an autonomous global actor.