The 2026 New Delhi summit captured the central contradiction within BRICS. Expansion has made the organisation more representative of an increasingly multipolar world, but less capable of acting as a unified pole within it.
BRICS, as of its 18th summit, now has ten members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE and Indonesia. Ten further countries participate as partners. Saudi Arabia has been invited to join but has not formally accepted, although its foreign minister attended the summit. Together, the members represent more than 40% of the global population and nearly a quarter of global GDP.
The summit produced plans for practical cooperation. Xi Jinping proposed a BRICS AI Open Source Zone, cooperation between special economic zones and a new trade in services forum. Members backed further work on cross-border payments, local-currency trade, a shared satellite network and an infectious-disease early-warning system. The New Development Bank has already financed almost $43 billion of projects. These initiatives could reduce dependence on Western finance and technology while increasing the structural power of the Global South.
However, economic scale does not automatically create a new pole. China and Russia want BRICS to become a stronger counterweight to the USA. Vladimir Putin presented it as a force for a fairer multipolar order. India supports multipolarity and reform of the IMF, World Bank and UN Security Council, but does not want BRICS to become an anti-Western alliance. Modi insisted that it was “not against anyone”. India cooperates with Russia and Iran while also developing its strategic relationship with the USA.
India and China are themselves strategic competitors. Xi’s first visit to India for seven years indicated a thaw following the deadly 2020 border clash, but their frontier remains disputed. They also compete for influence across Asia and leadership of the Global South. Both may gain from BRICS cooperation, but each remains concerned about the relative gains made by the other.
Expansion has added further divisions. In May 2026, BRICS foreign ministers failed to issue a joint statement because Iran and the UAE could not agree on the Iran-USA-Israel conflict. Tehran demanded condemnation of American and Israeli action. The UAE, which hosts American forces and had been attacked by Iran, wanted criticism of Tehran. The New Delhi Declaration eventually called for restraint, civilian protection, secure maritime trade and respect for sovereignty. It also criticised unilateral sanctions and tariffs. This was a diplomatic achievement because Iran and the UAE accepted the same document and their leaders met during the summit. Yet agreement was possible only because the declaration did not name those responsible or require either state to change its behaviour.
This is the realist trade-off facing an expanding institution. More members bring greater resources, representation and legitimacy, but also more interests that must be reconciled. BRICS has become a more important diplomatic forum in an increasingly multipolar world, but a less credible geopolitical bloc.