For much of the past decade, the Conservative Party presented itself as broadly aligned with the cross-party consensus on tackling climate change. This included accepting the principle that the sale of new petrol and diesel cars should eventually be phased out. However, the party’s stance has shifted noticeably in recent years, culminating in Kemi Badenoch’s proposal to scrap the ban on petrol vehicles altogether. This marks a clear departure from the position taken by the previous Conservative government and illustrates wider ideological changes within the party.
The original commitment to end the sale of new petrol and diesel cars was made under Boris Johnson’s government, which announced a ban from 2030. This was framed as part of a broader strategy to position the UK as a global leader on climate action, particularly in the run-up to COP26 in Glasgow. The policy reflected a form of green conservatism that combined environmental targets with optimism about British innovation, electric vehicle manufacturing, and long-term economic growth.
Under Rishi Sunak, this commitment began to soften. In 2023, the government delayed the ban from 2030 to 2035, arguing that households and businesses needed more time to adapt. Ministers stressed that the policy goal remained the same, but the language around it changed. Rather than presenting the ban as an opportunity, the government increasingly framed it as a potential burden on motorists, especially those on lower incomes or in rural areas. This shift suggested growing concern within the party about the electoral costs of ambitious climate policies.
Kemi Badenoch’s proposal goes further still. Writing in The Sunday Telegraph on 14 December, she described the plan as ‘well-meaning but ultimately destructive’, noting that the EU was also in the process of changing its position on electric vehicles. Her plan to scrap the ban on new petrol and diesel cars represents a decisive break from the earlier consensus. Badenoch has argued that the ban is economically unrealistic, risks harming British industry, and places unfair costs on consumers. In doing so, she reflects a more sceptical approach to state-led environmental regulation, prioritising market choice and individual freedom over long-term emissions targets.
This change is significant not only in policy terms but also ideologically. Earlier Conservative support for a petrol car ban accepted that government intervention was necessary to meet climate goals. Badenoch’s position suggests a return to a more traditional free-market conservatism, where technological change is expected to emerge organically rather than through regulation. It also aligns with a broader culture war narrative, in which environmental policies are portrayed as imposed by political elites and out of touch with everyday voters.
The Conservative Party’s position on petrol cars has moved from leadership on climate action, to cautious delay, and now to outright rejection of a central environmental policy. Badenoch’s plan to scrap the ban highlights how far the party has travelled from the Johnson-era commitment to net zero leadership. This evolution provides a clear example of how parties adapt their policies in response to electoral pressures, leadership change, and shifting ideological priorities.