3.3.2 – Informal Sources of Presidential Power
Operation Epic Fury, the joint American and Israeli military campaign against Iran launched on 28 February 2026, has drawn significant scrutiny not only for its strategic objectives but for the chaotic and contradictory manner in which the Trump administration has communicated its rationale to the public. Within days of the initial strikes, the president, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth had each offered materially different explanations for why the United States had gone to war, producing a communications breakdown that has raised serious questions about the coherence of American foreign policy at its most consequential.
The inconsistencies began almost immediately. Rubio told reporters on Capitol Hill that the strikes were launched pre-emptively because an Israeli attack on Iran was imminent and would have triggered Iranian retaliation against American forces in the region. Trump then contradicted his own Secretary of State, insisting instead that Iran itself was about to strike the United States directly. Hegseth, in turn, endorsed Trump’s version while simultaneously offering a third narrative centred on Iran’s conventional weapons build-up as a so-called shield for its nuclear ambitions. Most strikingly, Trump declared in one press conference that the war was “very complete,” while Hegseth told CBS News the same weekend that it was “only just the beginning.” When pressed on the contradiction, Trump responded that “you could say both.” The administration had also initially implied it was pursuing regime change, before Hegseth walked that back with the notable caveat that the regime had nevertheless changed and the world was better for it.
The practical and constitutional implications are significant. Under the War Powers Resolution, the president is required to justify military action on the basis of an imminent threat in order to proceed without a formal congressional declaration of war. Multiple intelligence officials acknowledged that no evidence existed suggesting Iran was about to strike the United States, undermining the legal basis for the operation and creating pressure for congressional oversight. Rubio’s specific use of the phrase “imminent threat” appeared designed to navigate this constitutional requirement, yet it was quickly abandoned once Trump offered a different explanation.
The episode illustrates how disordered presidential communications erode one of the most important informal sources of executive power: the ability to persuade. Richard Neustadt’s classic formulation holds that presidential power is, at its core, the power to persuade, and that a president’s authority rests not merely on constitutional office but on the credibility of their communications with Congress, the public and international partners. Multiple polls conducted since the strikes began show that around 56 to 59 per cent of Americans oppose military action, with just 36 per cent approving of Trump’s handling of Iran. When an administration cannot agree on why it went to war, it forfeits the persuasive authority that sustains public confidence and makes sustained military action politically viable.