3.1 – The state and globalisation
3.4 – Power and developments
3.6 – Comparative theories
When Francis Fukuyama wrote The End of History and the Last Man in 1992, he posited that the end of the Cold War meant that the world was at the “end of history” – that liberal-capitalist economies, democratic politics, and the rule of law had triumphed as a triad of features that any successful political society would eventually come to adopt. He did not say that this would happen immediately but did argue that the trend towards them was inexorable and inevitable. Many of the developments in global politics since have challenged his core thesis, especially developments in early 2026.
In Iran, the repression of democratic aspiration has been stark. Following renewed nationwide protests in late 2025, the state responded with overwhelming force. Human rights monitors estimate that tens of thousands were killed across several months of unrest, with mass arrests exceeding 200,000. The authorities imposed near total internet shutdowns in major cities, used Revolutionary Guard units in urban centres and expanded the use of special revolutionary courts operating without transparent procedures. Parliamentary elections scheduled for early 2026 were tightly controlled through Guardian Council vetting, with hundreds of reformist candidates disqualified. Here the rule of law exists formally but functions as an instrument of regime preservation rather than a neutral constraint on power. In Hong Kong (an administrative unit of China), the sentencing of Jimmy Lai to 20 years under the National Security Law symbolises the hollowing out of judicial independence. The conviction rested on broad definitions of collusion with foreign forces and sedition. Since 2020 more than 300 individuals have been arrested under the law. The “Hong Kong 47” case resulted in multiple prison terms of between four and ten years simply for organising an unofficial primary election. The “Basic Law” outlining Hong Kong’s distinct and autonomous political system remains in place, but its liberal guarantees have been subordinated to national security imperatives directed from Beijing.
Democratic backsliding and undermining the rule of law is not just a feature of authoritarian regimes; it is also apparent in democracies like the US, Hungary and India. Hungary and India continue to be dominated by nationalist parties (Fidesz and the BJP respectively) which have eroded freedom of the press and the competitiveness of other parties. In the USA, Trump has undermined the independence of the Supreme Court and other neutral bodies like the Federal Reserve through public criticism, has evaded Congressional scrutiny, and has continued to question the legitimacy of federal and state elections where Republican candidates have been unsuccessful. The US State Department also announced that it was willing to engage pragmatically with the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger), a group of West African states who have recently undergone coups by the military and are ruled by non-democratic governments. Previously, the American stance had been that engagement with these states was conditional on democratisation. Removing that conditionality and instead prioritising access to minerals and economic deals demonstrates that the USA is no longer the global engine of spreading democracy and the rule of law that it once was.
Nevertheless, there are some signs of democracy and the rule of law being protected. The recent trial and imprisonment of former South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol, along with several of his colleagues, for closing the National Assembly and launching an attempted military coup in late 2024, demonstrates the ongoing strength of democracy and the rule of law in South Korea. In the USA, the usually partisan Supreme Court’s 6-3 ruling which ruled Trump’s broad tariff system as unconstitutional shows that despite coming under severe pressure, the US still has functional internal mechanisms to protect the rule of law under the rule of law and ensure that major decisions remain the purview of the democratically-elected Congress. In addition, recent elections in Bangladesh, Thailand and Japan demonstrate that democracy and the rule of law remain robust in many parts of Asia, and in some ways are recovering – especially in Bangladesh, where the dictator Sheikh Hasina ruled virtually unchallenged between 2009 and 2024 before being overthrown in a popular revolution.
Overall, despite some bright spots, the rule of law and democracy are in global decline. Liberal economies are also facing challenges, with internal constraints like ageing populations requiring greater state intervention (e.g. in Japan), and globally, with tariffs and trade wars leading to the reconfiguration of global trade. Fukuyama’s thesis does not reflect the present situation. Nevertheless, it is important for the pendulum of judgement not to swing too far in the opposite direction and for us to say that we are seeing the collapse of global politics and a return to total anarchy. Democracy and the rule of law remain relatively robust in many parts of the world, and liberal economic trade deals continue to be struck, for example between Canada-China and the EU-India. We are, however, clearly in a period of global transformation in which the growth of democracy, liberal economies and the rule of law cannot be taken for granted or assumed as an inevitable development.