3.1 – The state and globalisation
3.2 – Global governance: political and economic
3.6 – Comparative theories
Since 2025, Donald Trump’s USA has imposed a slew of punitive tariffs on allies and rivals alike. This has steadily eroded the foundations of free trade and globalised neoliberal economy even more than he had in his first presidency. The growth in global trade has slowed – from 2.4% in 2024-2025 to 0.5% in 2025-2026 – we are not seeing “deglobalisation” but there is certainly a marked stagnation in the growth of trade. Realists and globalisation sceptics would argue that this represents a return to realist principles of states prioritising their self-interest and sovereignty over intermeshed structures of dependency and cooperation.
Nevertheless, the US’ more isolationist and insular (inward-looking) economic stance does not necessarily correspond with worldwide deglobalisation. Instead, while the overall pace of trade growth is slowing, we are seeing new linkages develop. For example, over the last two weeks, major trade deals have been announced between Canada and China, and the EU and India. The EU and India have struck what has been described as “the mother of all deals”, aiming to reciprocally eliminate tariffs on more than 99% of goods exported from India to the EU and vice versa, creating a free-trade zone of 2 billion people, representing a quarter of global GDP. Meanwhile, Canada has announced it will lift tariffs on Chinese EVs in exchange for China lifting agricultural tariffs, with the promise of further trade discussions. More modest agreements were made between the UK and China on a range of issues, including finance, green technology and healthcare, when Starmer visited Xi Jinping in Beijing for a visit to “reset” diplomatic ties. These developments could be seen as evidence for the liberal view that globalisation is an inevitable byproduct of modern flows of people, capital, goods and services, and that even if the US under Trump chooses to absent itself from the process, the rest of the world will continue to economically integrate.
However, a more convincing position may be that of transformationalists and “English-School” anarchical society theorists. While other states are developing and revitalising their economic ties as the US becomes an unreliable trade partner, this does not correspond to the full-bodied globalisation of the 1990s and early 2000s where states uncritically pursued economic integration with little political consideration. The UK and Canada, for example, while acknowledging the importance of developing economic ties with China and maintaining norms around reducing trade friction, do not want to create a new model of dependency with China, and would especially be cautious about dependency in key strategic areas like defence and critical resources. The new “re-globalisation” which is now emerging involves countries seeking out a broader range of trade partners and diversifying their exposure to risk from any one state, while trying to develop more autonomy in economic areas that they think are critical for security. This suggests, as anarchical society theory predicts, that while countries do try to maintain and develop shared norms for mutual benefit, they will also ultimately operate as sovereign actors in the national interest.