The Houthi capture of Perim Island and Yemen’s Red Sea coast opened a new front in the Iran-USA-Israel conflict. It also exposed the failure of Saudi Arabia’s military strategy in Yemen and the limits of the alliances intended to protect it.
The wider war began with American and Israeli attacks on Iran on 28 February 2026. Iran retaliated against American interests and disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia remained formally outside the conflict, but its alliance with the USA and its hosting of American forces made it vulnerable to Iranian pressure. The Iran-aligned Houthis retain their own leadership and objectives, but receive Iranian weapons, training and political support. In July, they declared a blockade of Saudi shipping and intensified attacks on Saudi cities, oil facilities and vessels. These attacks served the Houthis’ struggle against Riyadh while also raising the economic costs of the wider war for the USA and its partners.
Houthi forces then captured Mokha and Perim Island in the Bab el-Mandeb (which translates to the “Gate of Tears” in Arabic) Strait in a lightning offensive in September 2026. Around 12% of global trade and 7% of global petroleum supplies pass through the route. Missiles, drones and coastal artillery now allow the Houthis to threaten shipping without possessing a conventional navy.
The timing was particularly damaging for Saudi Arabia. Iranian disruption of Hormuz had forced Riyadh to redirect oil through its East-West pipeline towards Red Sea ports. By June, exports from its Red Sea terminal exceeded five million barrels per day. Houthi control around Bab el-Mandeb threatened this alternative route, while a drone attack forced the East-West pipeline itself to close temporarily.
The offensive revived a Yemeni conflict that Riyadh has spent years trying to escape. Saudi Arabia intervened in 2015 with advanced aircraft, extensive Western-supplied weaponry and a coalition of regional allies. Years of bombing neither removed the Houthis from Sanaa nor restored the internationally recognised government. The Houthis dispersed their forces, survived the air campaign and expanded their missile and drone capabilities. Saudi Arabia could destroy targets, but it could not translate military superiority into political control, illustrating the limits of hard power.
Riyadh attempted to diversify its protection through security regionalism. In August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, declaring that an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all. It promised intelligence sharing, joint exercises and greater military cooperation.
Its first major test immediately exposed its weakness. Pakistan’s defence minister suggested that Houthi attacks could activate the pact. The Pakistani foreign ministry then clarified that no military response was under discussion. Neither Pakistan nor Türkiye committed forces against the Houthis. Both valued cooperation with Saudi Arabia, but neither considered another war in Yemen to be in its national interest.
The USA responded similarly. Mohammed bin Salman requested direct American military assistance as the Houthis approached Bab el-Mandeb. Washington offered intelligence but declined to intervene, partly because its forces were already committed against Iran. Saudi Arabia therefore possessed several alliances but remained strategically exposed. The Mecca pact demonstrated growing security regionalism, but not collective security. Realism does not mean that alliances are worthless, but when intervention becomes costly, every state decides for itself whether another country’s security is worth fighting for.