This week the House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act by 262 votes to 159, having already cleared the Senate 86 to 11 in August. It now sits on Trump’s desk and he has said he will sign it. This is the first serious piece of Ukraine legislation since the emergency aid package of 2024, and the strongest action against Moscow since Trump returned to office. It also passed on the last day the House was sitting before the midterm elections on 3 November, which tells you something about how long it took to get there.
The bill is named after Senator Lindsey Graham, who introduced the first version in April 2025 and died suddenly in July, a day after announcing he had struck a deal with the White House. It imposes sanctions on Putin, senior officials, oligarchs and Russian banks, but its most powerful provision is a tariff of up to 100 per cent on the five biggest buyers of Russian oil and gas, which in practice means China and India. Russia has spent years finding ways around sanctions, and the argument from supporters is that it cannot find a way around tariffs aimed at its customers. Sanctions on Iran were added at Trump’s request. Importantly, the president can waive any of these measures simply by certifying to Congress that doing so serves the national interest.
The breakdown of the vote is where it gets interesting. Republicans backed it almost unanimously, 203 in favour and only seven against, while Democrats split badly, with 58 voting yes and 152 voting no. Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries voted against a bill designed to punish Russia, which sounds strange until you realise the objection was to Trump rather than to sanctions. Democratic leaders argued that he cannot be trusted with sweeping new tariff powers, that those tariffs would push up prices for American families, and that he already had the authority to act against Russia and had chosen not to use it.
What happens next is the real test. The bill gives Trump tools rather than instructions, leaving him to decide whether to impose the tariffs, who to target and when to waive them. He spent more than a year holding the legislation up precisely because he wanted to keep control of sanctions policy in his own hands, and Congress has now written that control into law. A large bipartisan majority looks like the legislature asserting itself, but a bill that leaves every meaningful decision to the president ends up strengthening the executive rather than restraining it.