Origins of the United Nations
The most important institution of global governance is the United Nations (UN). The United Nations was founded in 1945 as WWII drew to a close. Prior to this, the world had faced what some call a ‘long war’ over 3 decades. The United Nations was conceived as a replacement for the League of Nations, as an instrument of global governance and the prevention of wars; one that would hopefully be more effective than the League of Nations in doing so.
Article I of the UN Charter makes clear that the maintenance of international peace and security; the development of friendly international relations; and cooperation on global issues are the key aims of the UN. Article II reaffirms the principle of state sovereignty and emphasises that international disputes should be solved by peaceful means, rather than force.
Article I’s focus on friendly international relations, cooperation and interdependent mutual security seems to reflect a liberal view of global politics; one in which rational state actors cooperate under the banner of intergovernmental organisations to promote a common and collective good. Article II’s focus on state sovereignty, and the notion that the use of force against another state by the intergovernmental body is an absolute last resort seems to reflect a realist view of global politics; where nation-states are considered the main units of governance and infringing sovereignty is destabilising.
- Founded: 1945
- Membership: 193 member states (plus 2 observer states: Palestine and the Vatican City)
- Headquarters: New York City, USA
- Secretary-General: António Guterres (Portugal)
- Five active organs: Security Council, General Assembly, International Court of Justice (ICJ), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Secretariat
- Defunct organ: The Trusteeship Council (defunct since the independence of Palau in 1994)
“WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED; to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and; to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and; to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and; to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom…”
Preamble to the United Nations Charter, 1945
The Security Council (UNSC)
The UN Security Council’s role is the protection of international peace and security. It does not have any direct economic or environmental responsibilities. The resolutions (decisions) of the Security Council are binding on all UN member states, something which is not true of decisions made by other UN organs. Where necessary, the Security Council’s decisions can be enforced by UN peacekeepers, ‘blue-helmet’ soldiers who are provided voluntarily by UN member states and who serve under a UN flag. The UNSC is also responsible for recommending the UN Secretary-General; and recommending new nation-states for membership of the UN.
The Security Council is based in New York, at the UN’s Headquarters. It is composed of five permanent members (‘the P5’, who have irrevocable UNSC membership) and ten non-permanent members (elected for 2-year terms by the General Assembly). Security Council resolutions are passed by a 9 out of 15 majority. However, if one of the P5 vote against a resolution, even if all the other Security Council members vote for it, this is considered to be a veto and the resolution does not pass. Non-P5 members do not have a veto in the Security Council.
The UNSC represents the realities of power
The distribution of seats on the UNSC is not equitable in terms of population or continents, but it does reflect the distribution of economic, military and political power across the globe. Western states have a third of the seats because of their disproportionate power; Africa has a fifth, because as of yet, there are no superpowers in Africa. The P5 is characterised by the world’s nuclear powers (only four states outside the P5 have them). Having the most powerful states as the P5 means that when the UNSC has to execute an intervention, it is more likely to succeed because it is backed by the ‘weight’ of global power. Major military operations like the enforcement of a no-fly zone over northern Iraq to protect the Kurds (UNSC Resolution 688) or Libya to protect civilians in Benghazi (UNSC Resolution 1973) could fundamentally not have happened without the participation of the USA.
The UNSC has an unrepresentative composition
Asia, representing approximately 60% of the global population, only has a fifth of the seats. The discrepancy is even more extreme in the P5, where three out of five states are ‘Western democracies’, one is a European non-democracy (Russia) and only one is non-Euro-Western (China). Major emerging countries, like India and Brazil, and Germany (the 3rd largest economy), do not have permanent representation on the Security Council. This has led to criticisms of the UNSC as a “pillar of global apartheid” (Titus Alexander) and as having an “unjust and undemocratic structure” (Ayatollah Khamenei). It may also lead to selective interventions in conflicts, e.g. assisting oil-rich Kuwait in 1991, but largely ignoring the Rwandan Genocide three years later.
The UNSC is capable of acting collaboratively
The UNSC has proven itself capable of collaborative action, authorising interventions and peacekeeping operations that have been successful in many instances. For example, UNSC Resolution 1528 (all states voted for, none abstained or voted against) authorised a peacekeeping operation in Côte d’Ivoire after a damaging civil war which saw 3,000 killed and over 300,000 people displaced as refugees. The UN deployed nearly 12,000 peacekeepers; disarmed 70,000 combatants from various armed factions and reintegrated them into Ivorian society; oversaw two peaceful elections and the return of 250,000 refugees; and decreased intercommunal conflict by 80% by 2017.
The UNSC is crippled by internal rivalries
Because of the operation of the P5 veto, anything which contradicts the core national interest of one of the P5 members will be vetoed, or withdrawn under the threat of veto. In order to ‘protect’ Israel, the USA’s Negroponte Doctrine states that it will veto any resolution critical of Israel unless it also condemns Palestinian terrorist groups; in the 2023–2024 Gaza conflict, the USA vetoed three resolutions calling for an “immediate ceasefire” or “humanitarian pauses”, as well as a proposal for Palestinian statehood. In order to prevent criticism of Bashar Assad, their Syrian ally, Russia has vetoed 17 resolutions, and has vetoed 4 resolutions on its aggression in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea between 2014 and 2022.
The UNSC represents the principles of collective security
The UNSC represents the principle of collective security, that an attack on any state should be considered as an attack on the global order of sovereignty and peace, and that this should be dealt with by all states acting in concert. An example is the 1990s Gulf War, where Iraq invaded the oil-rich state of Kuwait and was repelled by a coalition force authorised by the UNSC. Since the end of WWII, there have been approximately 120 conflicts worldwide, but only 10% of these have been interstate invasion (e.g. the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s), the others have been intrastate civil wars, suggesting that the UNSC has been successful at promoting the ‘norm’ of non-aggression.
The UNSC has been unsuccessful at preventing conflict
The UNSC has struggled to prevent conflict within states, because it is harder to gain consensus on humanitarian interventions than it is to stop clear-cut cases of interstate aggression. Many intrastate conflicts today with high casualties, e.g. the civil war in Sudan, the civil war in Myanmar, or Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave populated by Armenians, have not been discussed at length by the UNSC. In addition, P5-member Russia’s invasion of Crimea (2014) and southwestern Ukraine (2022) have undermined the principle of non-aggression and may lead to further interstate conflicts.
- The P5: USA, UK, France, Russia (who formally inherited the seat of the Soviet Union in 1992), and China (the People’s Republic replaced the Republic of China in 1971)
- Veto mechanism: If any one of the P5 votes against a resolution, it fails, even if all other 14 members vote in favour
- Origins: The P5 were the leading Allied victors of WWII; their permanent membership reflects the power realities of 1945
- Recent US vetoes: The USA has vetoed three resolutions calling for an “immediate ceasefire” in the 2023–2024 Gaza conflict, citing the Negroponte Doctrine (veto any resolution critical of Israel unless it also condemns Palestinian terrorist groups)
- Recent Russian vetoes: Russia has vetoed 17 resolutions on Syria to protect its ally Bashar Assad, and 4 resolutions on Ukraine between 2014 and 2022
The Veto in Practice
In order to ‘protect’ Israel, the USA’s Negroponte Doctrine states that the US will veto any resolution critical of Israel unless it explicitly also condemns Palestinian terrorist groups. In the 2023–2024 Gaza conflict, the USA has vetoed three resolutions calling for “immediate ceasefire” or “humanitarian pauses”, as well as a proposal for Palestinian statehood.
In order to prevent criticism of Bashar Assad, their Syrian ally, Russia has vetoed 17 resolutions. In terms of Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, 4 resolutions have been vetoed between 2014 and 2022.
Between 1951 and 1991, the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the USA prevented consensus on many issues as both would exercise their veto if they felt their national and ideological interests or those of their allies were threatened. With the USSR’s collapse, the US was the sole, dominant global superpower and was able to dominate the Security Council. Between 1991 and 2001, the UN intervened in as many conflicts as it did between 1951 and 1991.
The UNSC has an unrepresentative composition
Asia, representing approximately 60% of the global population, only has a fifth of the seats. The discrepancy is even more extreme in the P5, where three out of five states are ‘Western democracies’, one is a European non-democracy (Russia) and only one is non-Euro-Western (China). Major emerging countries, like India and Brazil, and Germany (the 3rd largest economy), do not have permanent representation on the Security Council. This has led to criticisms of the UNSC as a “pillar of global apartheid” (Titus Alexander); as having an “unjust and undemocratic structure” (Ayatollah Khamenei). It may also lead to selective interventions in conflicts, e.g. assisting oil-rich Kuwait in 1991, but largely ignoring the Rwandan Genocide three years later.
The General Assembly (UNGA)
The UN General Assembly, like the UNSC, is based at the UN Headquarters in New York. All 193 UN member states have a delegation of three representatives, who collectively cast a single vote on resolutions. There are two observer states (Palestine and the Vatican City) who can participate in debates, but do not have the right to vote. Each member state has one vote, regardless of population, votes are decided by a simple majority (50% of votes cast), except for particularly important issues like the UN budget, expulsion of member states, and recommendations on peace and security, in which case a supermajority (66%) is required.
The UNGA may debate and pass resolutions on any issue, including human rights, poverty reduction and environmental issues. They specifically have the power to elect the officers of the UN (including the Secretary-General and the non-permanent members of the UNSC) and to vote on the admission, suspension and expulsion of member states. The UNGA is able to pass resolutions on conflicts, but these are not legally binding.
As Dennis Francis argued in 2023, “if it did not exist, we would have to create it”, given how vital it is as a unique space in which problems affecting countries can be discussed. The value of the UNGA is highlighted by the fact that no state has ever permanently withdrawn (and only one has ever done so temporarily, Indonesia between 1965 and 1966). More powerful states do not get to veto UNGA resolutions, and they are often outvoted by developing states. For example, the Group of 77 was instrumental in passing resolutions against the apartheid regime of South Africa in the 1980s; against Israel’s current occupation of and settlement-building in the West Bank; and in favour of global disarmament.
The UNGA is based on equal representation
All states are given one vote, regardless of population size or economic, military and political power. This encourages participation from smaller states, and ensures their voices can be heard. For many smaller states, the UN is their principal outlet for foreign policy and influence. More powerful states do not get to veto UNGA resolutions, and they are often outvoted by developing states; for example, the Group of 77 was instrumental in passing resolutions against the apartheid regime of South Africa in the 1980s.
The UNGA represents states, not people
The UNGA awards each state a single and equivalently-weighted vote, regardless of population size. It is possible (but unlikely) for states representing only 5% of the global population to pass a vote on an important issue (66% of states) because the global population is so unevenly distributed, which may be seen as undemocratic. Furthermore, because the UN is based on the principle of state sovereignty, the concerns of oppressed minority groups such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Uighurs in China, and LGBT people in Chechnya (Russia) are overlooked, because states debate and vote based on the interests of the national government.
The UNGA promotes dialogue
The UNGA allows nation-states to voice their concerns and grievances, and perhaps solve them, rather than devolving into military conflict. The opportunity for ‘verbal sparring’, even where it may not seem productive, e.g. Khrushchev banging his shoe on a table and denouncing the Filipino delegates as “toadies of American imperialism” in 1960, is still better than war. Although the UNGA cannot prevent all conflict, the number of interstate conflicts has fallen massively since 1945 (since then, they have only represented about 10% of all global conflicts), suggesting that dialogue has superseded violence.
The UNGA ‘rewards’ dictatorship
The Assembly’s model of one-state-one-vote ‘rewards’ dictatorial countries, because an autocratic state gets to cast a vote in the UN on behalf of all their citizens and cultivate international legitimacy for their regime, regardless of whether or not their citizens have democratically consented to this. Because all nation-states are considered of equivalent value in the UNGA, despotic regimes can play a key role in shaping global policy. For example, the UNHRC (UN Human Rights Council), a subsidiary organ of the UNGA, was in 2015 presided over by Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that the Saudi government had beheaded more people than ISIS that year.
The UNGA is a global forum
This enables it to discuss a wide array of global issues. An example is the 31st UN General Assembly Special Session on the coronavirus pandemic, where state representatives gathered to discuss how to tackle the economic, social and political fallout of the virus, especially on vulnerable states. The value of the UNGA is highlighted by the fact that no state has ever permanently withdrawn (and only one has ever done so temporarily, Indonesia between 1965 and 1966).
The UNGA is merely a talking shop
The Assembly does not have the power to make binding resolutions, these must also be approved by the UNSC to take effect. The same issues are debated over and over again without any significant progress in the real world. For example, Israel has ignored a number of reiterated resolutions, e.g. on abolishing its illegal nuclear weapons programme; settlement-building in the West Bank; the occupation of Palestinian territories; and the annexation of the Golan Heights from Syria. There is no way to enforce compliance with them without the UNSC.
Other UN Bodies
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
The ICJ, unlike most other organs of the UN, is not based in New York, but in The Hague (Netherlands). It is comprised of fifteen judges elected for nine-year terms by the General Assembly and Security Council, with the distribution of seats fixed for different regions of the world to ensure equitable representation. The Court’s judges then elect a President and Vice-President for triennial terms to oversee the Court’s proceedings. For 2024–2027, the President will be Nawaf Salam (Lebanon), and the Vice-President will be Julia Sebutinde (Uganda). Unlike the UNSC and UNGA, these judges are expected to renounce allegiance to their own nation-states upon taking the bench, and to make their decisions as neutral, impartial figures. (In practice, this may not happen.)
The role of the ICJ is to settle legal disputes between UN member states and give advisory legal opinions to UN agencies who request them. If contentious cases are (i) between states and (ii) all states involved agree to abide by the ruling, the ruling is considered legally binding and can be enforced by the UNSC. Advisory opinions or rulings on contentious cases where one or both state parties have not agreed to ICJ jurisdiction are not considered legally binding but are widely respected and followed regardless.
The ICJ upholds international law
The ICJ is the principal institution which upholds the idea of a global ‘international law’ that should apply to all states. The concept of international law requires an international court to arbitrate disputes between states according to established principles and conventions. This includes conflict resolution, but also the regulation of treaties such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which concerns maritime boundaries and responsibilities. For example, in 1984, the ICJ ruled on a case delimiting the continental shelf between Canada and the USA in the Gulf of Maine in eastern North America.
The ICJ’s jurisdiction is conditional
The ICJ’s jurisdiction only applies when both states have agreed to it. For example, in 2018, Iran filed a case against the US as a result of sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, who claimed Iran was illegally developing nuclear weapons. Iran argued that the sanctions violated the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the USA and Iran. The ICJ ruled in Iran’s favour and issued an interim order for the USA to lift sanctions on ‘humanitarian goods and civil aviation’. The USA simply refused and withdrew from the Treaty of Amity, pointing out that it had not agreed to ICJ jurisdiction on the matter.
The ICJ is genuinely neutral
The fifteen ICJ judges are required to be independent and neutral by Articles 16–18 of the ICJ Statute. Judges are not allowed to hold any other judicial or legal post in any state, or to act as counsel in a professional capacity. If a state in an ICJ case does not have a judge of its nationality on the Court, it can appoint an ‘ad hoc’ judge to ensure it is not discriminated against. Neutrality means that states are willing to submit disputes to the Court even where rulings are disadvantageous, e.g. in 2024, the UK agreed to return the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean to Mauritian sovereignty, five years after a 2019 ICJ ruling that the UK’s continued occupation was illegal.
The ICJ’s rulings are unenforceable
The ICJ’s rulings are realistically unenforceable. It is often the case that rulings against powerful states go unenforced, because there is no collective consensus in the UNSC for doing so. For example, in 2024, the ICJ ruled that Israel’s ongoing occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, were unlawful, and that creeping annexation through settler-colonial outposts must be reversed and financial reparations given to the Palestinians. It seems highly unlikely that Israel, especially under the right-wing Netanyahu government, would ever agree to such measures; and the US would certainly veto any enforcement of the ICJ ruling in the UN Security Council.
The ICJ defuses potential conflicts
Nation-states may often feel that they cannot back down from the verge of a potential conflict because it would lead to a loss of prestige and respect. ICJ rulings provide a way for states to draw back from the brink without ‘losing face’, making it less likely that conflicts will break out. For example, Preah Vihear is a 900-year-old Hindu temple on the Thai-Cambodian border, claimed by both states. Both agreed to ICJ arbitration in 1962, which awarded the temple to Cambodia, and the Court reaffirmed the ruling in 2013. This effectively defused nationalist tensions and deadly border clashes for over half a century until violence again flared briefly in 2025.
The ICJ cannot solve intra-state conflict
The ICJ only deals with disputes between states and does not have the authority to rule on conflicts within states. This renders it powerless in dealing with the majority of global disputes today, which are generally intra-state issues: civil wars and disputes about secession, e.g. the Kurds in Iraq, the Catalans in Spain, or China’s suppression of democratic protests in Hong Kong; intra-state genocides, e.g. Darfur (Sudan) or Bosnia (Yugoslavia); or severe human rights abuses, e.g. Iran’s violent suppression of protests. (There is some indication that by invoking the interstate obligations of the Genocide Convention, intra-state genocides can be dealt with by the ICJ.)
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
ECOSOC is located in the UN Headquarters in New York, alongside the General Assembly and Security Council. It has 54 member states at any one time, elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly. Like the Security Council, it has fixed numbers of seats for different regions of the world. The ECOSOC President is elected for a one-year term and by convention is drawn from a small or mid-ranking nation-state (recently, Presidents have come from Chile, Botswana, Pakistan, Saint Vincent and Bulgaria). This reflects ECOSOC’s principal mandate, which is to discuss international economic and social problems and formulate policy recommendations for individual UN member states and the UN as a whole.
ECOSOC meets for a seven-week session every July, and for a shorter meeting every April with the World Bank and the IMF. ECOSOC coordinates the activities of a number of United Nations sub-organisations, but does not directly control their policy decisions:
- Functional commissions (e.g. the Commission on Narcotic Drugs)
- Regional commissions (e.g. the Economic Commission for Europe)
- Special agencies (e.g. the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Organisation (WHO))
ECOSOC encourages development
ECOSOC is able to boost social, economic and environmental development through its coordination and implementation of key policy initiatives and overarching goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030).
ECOSOC’s outcomes are mixed
The actual record of policy achievement by ECOSOC and the agencies it coordinates is extremely mixed. The MDGs were criticised for being excessively broad, and for being too unevenly achieved across the planet (with some countries not achieving any, and ecological targets being routinely missed).
ECOSOC gives a voice to weaker states
Weaker states are given a forum to voice specific concerns relating to economic development (which may not gain as much traction in the UNSC or UNGA), especially because of the convention that ECOSOC should be presided over by a diplomat from a small or mid-ranking power (recently they have been from Chile, Botswana, Pakistan and Bulgaria).
ECOSOC’s mandate is incoherent
Arguably, ECOSOC does not have an obvious, distinct mandate. Several key agencies which should logically fall under ECOSOC’s umbrella are instead accountable to the UNGA (e.g. the World Food Programme), or jointly accountable to both organs (e.g. UNICEF); this undermines ECOSOC’s ability to make coherent policy and deliver outcomes.
ECOSOC benefits from NGO expertise
ECOSOC grants ‘consultative status’ to NGOs who apply for it, which enables them to submit reports, consult and participate in discussions, and contribute directly to ECOSOC’s policymaking process. This enables it to draw on specific expertise, e.g. Feed the Children, EcoHealth, or the Special Olympics.
ECOSOC has insufficient control over the agencies it monitors
While ECOSOC can monitor the activities of its special agencies, it cannot compel them. These agencies may respond to state pressure more than to ECOSOC, e.g. the WHO bowing to Chinese pressure in early 2020 to understate the scale of the emergent coronavirus pandemic.
The Secretariat
This is the ‘civil service’ of the UN. Over 40,000 international civil servants work for the Secretariat across a range of departments and based in many different states. They produce reports which inform the discussions of other UN organs, and which carry a great deal of weight in influencing world opinion. The leader of the Secretariat is the ‘Secretary-General’, who directs its operation; notifies the UNSC of matters they believe are a threat to world peace; and carries out a great deal of behind-the-scenes diplomacy to resolve potential conflicts.
The Secretary-General (as of May 2024, this is Antonio Guterres of Portugal) is the chief administrative officer of the UN and is often seen as the public face of the UN. Their status enables them to play a major role in negotiating agreements (e.g. Ban Ki-Moon’s [South Korea] success in helping to get states to agree to the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015), and mediating disputes (e.g. U Thant’s [Myanmar] central role in defusing US-Soviet tensions during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962–1963, mediating between Kennedy and Khrushchev).
Nevertheless, the Secretary-General has often been criticised as the “lowest common denominator”, their appointment must be approved by all members of the UNSC, which means any ‘controversial’ nomination would be vetoed. The Secretary-General is unable to restrain powerful states from acting in their own interests, e.g. despite UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan condemning the war in Iraq in 2003 as “illegal”, he was unable to stop the US-led invasion.
Two different courts
Students often confuse the ICJ (International Court of Justice), the judicial organ of the UN that settles disputes between states, with the ICC (International Criminal Court), an entirely separate body established under the Rome Statute that prosecutes individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, the ‘crime of aggression’ and genocide. All UN member states are automatically party to the ICJ, but only Rome Statute signatories are party to the ICC.
Peacekeeping
Even though the UNSC might agree to pass a resolution, it does not automatically mean that a conflict has been successfully resolved. Many other obstacles might arise. The UNSC represents the principle of collective security, that an attack on any state should be considered as an attack on the global order of sovereignty and peace and that this should be dealt with by all states acting in concert.
Notable Successes
- Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC Resolution 1528): All states voted for, none abstained or voted against. The UN deployed nearly 12,000 peacekeepers after a damaging civil war which saw 3,000 killed and over 300,000 people displaced as refugees. The mission disarmed 70,000 combatants from various armed factions and reintegrated them into Ivorian society; oversaw two peaceful elections and the return of 250,000 refugees; and decreased intercommunal conflict by 80% by 2017
- Gulf War (1990s): Iraq invaded the oil-rich state of Kuwait and was repelled by a coalition force authorised by the UNSC, demonstrating the principle of collective security
Notable Failures
- Somalia (1992–1995): UN peacekeeping forces were not numerous enough to restore stability after the civil war because of the ethno-tribal divisions throughout the very large country, and withdrew in 1995
- Yugoslavia (1993–1995): UN peacekeepers were not given a mandate to use lethal force to prevent massacres, leading to the Srebrenica Genocide of 8,000 Bosnian Muslims committed by the Serb forces of the Republika Srpska, as Dutch peacekeepers looked on helplessly
- Rwanda (1994): The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) did not have a mandate for the use of force and was unable to prevent the Rwandan genocide. Belgian troops, who provided the main component of UNAMIR, withdrew after 10 Belgian soldiers were killed protecting Rwandan president Uwilingiyimana in Kigali, the capital
The UN’s Largest Peacekeeping Operation
The UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo is a UN peacekeeping force that has been deployed in the Congo since 1999 to prevent violence from conflicts such as the aftermath of the Second Congo War, and the localised Ituri, Kivu and Dongo conflicts. MONUSCO (the acronym is based on its French name) is currently authorised by UNSC Resolution 2556 (2020) and led by Bintou Keita from Guinea. The operation initially began simply as a force of observers to ensure compliance with the post-Congo War peace treaties, but also carries out patrols where clashes are taking place, and under the FIB (Force Intervention Brigade) has a mandate for offensive force. As of 2022, nearly 15,000 UN personnel (police, experts, troops and officers) have been deployed; the biggest contributors are from South Asia, including India (the single largest contributor), Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh.
A notable success of MONUSCO is simply the continued existence of the Democratic Republic of Congo, without it, it is likely that the country would have balkanised (fractured along ethnic lines) a long time ago. MONUSCO has also trained police, officers and members of the judiciary; facilitated humanitarian assistance like food and medicine to Congo’s 1.5 million internal refugees; protected aid workers; and overseen fair elections. In 2022, MONUSCO’s total budget was over $1.02 billion, it is the UN’s largest operation.
Nevertheless, MONUSCO has suffered many failures and setbacks, partially because of limited resources. The number of armed groups has risen, and an increasing number of civilians have been harmed in regional conflicts, e.g. over 60,000 civilians killed and 140,000 displaced in the Ituri conflict in Eastern Congo. As a result, many Congolese citizens have lost faith in MONUSCO and the government has responded by promising that the delegitimised operation will be withdrawn from the country as soon as possible.
Development
The UN has played a central role in global development policy, particularly through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, 2000–2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, 2015–2030), coordinated by ECOSOC and a constellation of UN agencies.
The Evolution of UN Development Goals
The Millennium Development Goals were agreed by the UN as a result of the Millennium Declaration resolution by the UN General Assembly in 2000. It commits UN member states and other IGOs to achieving eight goals centred on socio-economic development: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality rates; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria; (7) ensure environmental stability; (8) develop a global partnership for development. Each goal is broken into measurable targets, usually based on reducing negative metrics by a certain proportion between 1990 and 2015. Much of the work towards these targets was coordinated by ECOSOC.
There has been substantial progress towards some of the goals; the MDG1A (halving extreme poverty) target was exceeded, falling from 47% in developing regions in 1990 to 14% in 2015; $130bn worth of debt cancellations at the 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit helped developing states focus more funds on healthcare and education; gender disparity was eliminated at all education levels globally; malaria and TB rates were slashed; and the proportion of the world without clean drinking water fell from 24% to 9% (MDG7C).
In other areas, there were narrow misses: the proportion of individuals suffering from hunger fell from 23.3% in developing regions to 12.9% (undershooting the target of 11.5%) [MDG1C], partially because of the development of new varieties of hybrid crops like NERICA rice which has significantly improved food self-sufficiency in West and Central Africa. Infant mortality fell from 90/1,000 births to 43/1,000 (undershooting the target of 30/1,000) [MDG4A]: Bangladesh and Nepal are particular success stories in this area.
Conversely, there were serious failures in other areas: mostly to do with MDG7 and environmental targets. Multiple metrics show that ‘sustainable development’ [MDG7A] is not happening: carbon emissions rose by 50%, global forest cover continued to collapse; and the ‘Red List Index’ shows that biodiversity is worse than ever with the number of species, and number of wild animals declining at worrying rates [MDG7B].
It is also worth noting that many of the Millennium Development Goals which were achieved were hit because of the actions of a relatively small group of nation-states. For example, China reduced the number of citizens in poverty from 452 million to 278 million; there were also substantial poverty reductions in India and East Asia. In other parts of the world, most targets were missed. Sub-Saharan Africa as a region was 12.5% away from reaching the goal for reducing extreme poverty by 50%; and not a single low-income country met the MDG2 target of every child getting a full course of primary education (only 64 out of 157 states met this target).
A new set of global targets was devised in 2015: the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, measured between 2015 and 2030. Some key differences from the MDGs are that (i) they apply to all states, not just developing states, (ii) they place much more emphasis on gender equality, (iii) they deal with broader issues, including peace, justice and strong institutions; decent work and economic growth; and a broader understanding of ‘wellbeing’; (iv) they place significantly more emphasis on environmental and ecological targets with several of the goals focused on this (SDG7 – affordable and clean energy; SDG11 – sustainable growth and cities; SDG12 – responsible consumption and production; SDG13 – climate action; SDG14 – life below water; SDG15 – life on land). They represent a much more ambitious, interconnected and holistic approach to global development.
Has the UN Been Effective?
It is important to assess the UN as a whole and identify the manner in which it is able to tackle the key global problems of conflict resolution; poverty and development; human rights protection; and environmental issues. It may be more impactful in some of these areas than others, and the impact may vary between different organs according to membership, internal structure and other procedural mechanisms.
Peacekeeping successes demonstrate collective security
The UN has successfully dealt with conflict through the UN Security Council, which can authorise peacekeeping missions and interventions to stop conflicts that are underway, enforce peace in post-conflict zones, and even to deter conflict from breaking out in high-risk areas. For example, UN military intervention in Bosnia in 1992 was a critical part of bringing the conflict to a close; while the establishment of an Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo in the late 1990s was crucial to preventing the resurgence of Kosovar-Serb violence. In addition, other mechanisms and organs of the UN, such as the UN General Assembly and ICJ provide a forum for states to resolve tensions that might otherwise erupt into open war. The UN’s Charter and prohibition on aggressive interstate war, as well as other treaties signed under the aegis of the UN like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on nuclear weapons, have been vital in promoting a “normative peace” between states. The restriction of nuclear weapons to only nine states out of 193 can be seen as a particular success in this regard.
P5 divisions paralyse the Security Council
The deep and growing divides amongst the P5 of the UN Security Council, given the resurgence of Russia and the rise of China and the decline of US hegemony, have made it more difficult for the Security Council to agree on necessary interventions, sanctions or diplomatic pressure to defuse conflicts. For example, Russia often wields the veto in the Security Council in defence of its own actions in Ukraine, as well as Assad’s war crimes in Syria; the US often wields the veto in defence of Israel and has done so four times since the onset of the 2023 phase of the Israel-Gaza war. While the UN General Assembly is more likely to pass resolutions aimed at resolving conflict and upholding peace and security, the non-binding nature of these resolutions makes it less relevant as an organ in tackling these issues. The UN has been unable to maintain the “normative peace” and the taboo against interstate aggression in the last decade; the Iraq War, the Armenia-Azerbaijan War, the Israel-Gaza War, and the Russia-Ukraine War have contributed to its erosion. Russia and the US, as members of the P5, can be seen as particularly responsible for this as it suggests that even those sitting at the ‘top table’ do not respect the rules-based order.
The UN has built a global human rights framework
The UN has successfully advanced rights through a number of documents, treaties and conventions, such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The UN Charter itself contains an explicit commitment to “faith in human rights”. Over the past half-century, the UN has built up a significant number of well-entrenched agencies and organisations that tackle general and specific human rights issues, such as the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and the United Nations Development Fund for Women; these are often jointly accountable to the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC. In addition, the UN Security Council may invoke peacekeeping operations in conflict zones, which have the impact of protecting rights (e.g. MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo) or impose sanctions (e.g. those imposed on South Africa in the late 1970s in response to apartheid) to pressure states on rights issues. Finally, the ICJ’s intervention in the recent Gambia v Myanmar and South Africa v Israel cases signals that the UN’s highest court is beginning to take on an important role in upholding human rights and preventing or punishing the crime of genocide.
Rights commitments lack enforcement
The UN has failed to advance rights since most of the documents, treaties and conventions that have been signed between states to protect rights have been generated through the UN General Assembly, where resolutions and agreements are non-binding. In addition, participation is voluntary and there are consequently notable absences, e.g. China’s non-ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). While the UN Security Council can act to protect rights by issuing economic embargoes or sanctioning interventions, it often does not fulfil this purpose because of deadlock and tensions between the P5, who can exercise a veto to kill off resolutions, e.g. the US vetoing a ceasefire in the Israel-Gaza War and Russia vetoing a ceasefire in the Sudanese Civil War within a week of each other in November 2024. This limits the UNSC’s credibility and ability to tackle human rights abuses when issues of national interest are at stake. Finally, the ICJ’s interventions against Myanmar and Israel have been relatively limited and their provisional measures have not been enforced; the legal basis for their ruling under the Genocide Convention is also not generalisable to other human rights issues.
The MDGs and SDGs have reduced global poverty
The UN has successfully promoted development and the reduction of global poverty over the seven decades of its existence. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), passed by the UN General Assembly and enacted through ECOSOC and a constellation of UN agencies have been remarkably successful in reducing extreme poverty around the world in recent decades. In particular, the SDGs have had a renewed focus on poverty reduction interlinking with other issues such as gender inequality and environmental sustainability, which makes them more robust. The UN General Assembly, as an organ which gives all states an equally-weighted vote, has become a critical forum for the voices of developing states to press this agenda (as opposed to in the more ‘elite’ UNSC), and coalitions like the G77 have successfully pushed for poverty reduction as a key goal of the UN.
Development gains are unevenly distributed
The UN has failed to promote development in an equitable and sustainable way. Even though there have been ‘headline’ successes in poverty reduction under the MDGs and SDGs, these have not been evenly distributed, most of the gains have come from China and Southeast Asia, while significant parts of sub-Saharan Africa remain mired in extreme poverty (and in some cases have even had worsened rates of poverty in recent years). The UN is not sufficiently focused on poverty reduction and development, since the UN Security Council does not consider this as one of its fundamental goals; and the UN General Assembly is often unable to secure sufficient financial commitment from states to make a meaningful difference. ECOSOC, through its range of sub-agencies, has had some impact but many of its structures are confused and undermined by overlapping competencies and layers of conflicting accountability (e.g. UNICEF).
The UN has built a global climate consensus
The UN has successfully protected the environment, this has been achieved by establishing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change at the Rio Summit (1992). Under this framework, major climate summits such as Kyoto and Paris have been held in which all states have committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and to a future net-zero ‘decarbonisation’ target, with those of major states ranging from 2050 to 2080. The universal level of participation in and commitment to these UN-led procedures shows that the UN has been successful in building a policy consensus around climate change (this has also been aided by the UN Environment Programme’s creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which has collated scientific research to make the case for the existence of anthropogenic warming and convince states of the urgency of the problem).
Environmental commitments remain unenforceable
The UN has failed to protect the environment, despite the establishment of different UN-led initiatives and frameworks to tackle environmental issues, this was never a foundational aim of the original UN Charter. Environmental aspects of the UN’s work therefore tend to be more recent and less well-developed. Issues to do with the environment are overlooked by the UN Security Council (which only deals with peace and security), which in turn means that it is difficult to enforce environment-related commitments and policies with the same rigour as other international decisions. While there has certainly been important work in the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC to tackle environmental issues (including concerns like food security, pollution and biodiversity), these have failed to rise to the scale and pace that ecological challenges require, because of states’ objections to them.