Hard power has traditionally been defined as the ability of states to achieve their objectives through military force and coercion. Realists argue that military capabilities remain the foundation of international politics because states operate in an anarchic system where survival depends on military strength. However, recent conflicts suggest that the nature of hard power is changing. While conventional military power remains important, drones, autonomous systems and asymmetric warfare have reduced some of the advantages traditionally enjoyed by great powers.
The war in Ukraine provides the clearest example. Russia entered the conflict with overwhelming advantages in manpower, armour, artillery, air power and nuclear weapons. Yet it failed to achieve its initial objectives of capturing Kyiv, removing the Ukrainian government and forcing Ukraine into submission in a “three-day special operation”. Despite facing heavy casualties and initial setbacks, Ukraine has increasingly relied on asymmetric capabilities, particularly drones, to offset Russia’s conventional superiority. A key development has been the emergence of cost asymmetry. Ukraine produced around 4 million “robotic and autonomous systems” (i.e. unmanned drones) in 2025 and is projected to produce 5-6 million in 2026, with officials claiming capacity could eventually reach 20 million drones annually if fully funded. Rather than relying on a handful of major defence contractors, Ukraine has developed a decentralised production system that allows rapid innovation and makes manufacturing difficult to disrupt.
The significance lies in the relationship between cost and effect. Ukrainian drones costing thousands of pounds have repeatedly struck Russian infrastructure worth millions. In June 2026, Ukrainian forces targeted a rail bridge near Rozdolne in Crimea, the Kerch thermal power plant oil depot and electrical infrastructure supporting Russian operations. Rather than destroying Russian armies directly, Ukraine increasingly seeks to disrupt the logistics, energy and transport systems that sustain them. This exposes a major vulnerability in traditional industrial military power. Russia’s defence industry relies heavily on large, concentrated industrial sites. A notable example is Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil, often described as the world’s largest tank factory, employing around 30,000 workers and producing or refurbishing many of Russia’s T-72, T-80 and T-90 tanks. Russia’s war economy also depends on major refineries, rail hubs and large drone production facilities. These “megafactories” can generate huge military output but are difficult to conceal and expensive to defend.
Iran provides a second example of changing hard power. Iran cannot compete directly with the USA in direct military terms, as seen by the rapid American destruction of Iran’s conventional navy and its inability to prevent the aerial bombardment of Tehran and other military and political targets. However, it has developed drones, missiles and proxy networks that allow it to challenge stronger opponents indirectly. The Shahed-136 drone is estimated to cost roughly $20,000-$50,000, while a Patriot interceptor used to destroy it can cost approximately $4 million. This asymmetry allowed Iran to effectively close the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping by imposing a level of threat that meant that cargo was uninsurable. This demonstrates how weaker actors can force stronger states to spend vastly greater resources simply to maintain defence. Military power increasingly involves imposing unsustainable costs on an opponent rather than defeating them conventionally.
These developments suggest that new military frontiers are emerging. Advances in drones, artificial intelligence, autonomy and precision strike technology have altered the relationship between military expenditure and military effectiveness. Smaller powers can increasingly threaten infrastructure, logistics and industrial capacity without possessing large conventional armies. The most important measure of military power may no longer be the size of a state’s armed forces, but its ability to innovate and create favourable cost exchanges.
However, it would be inaccurate to conclude that traditional military power has become irrelevant. Russia continues to occupy significant areas of Ukrainian territory because of its superior manpower, artillery and industrial resources. Similarly, the USA remains the world’s most powerful military actor because of its nuclear arsenal, global military bases, aircraft carrier groups and alliance network. Drones and asymmetric capabilities can complicate military operations, but they have not replaced conventional armed forces.