The June 2026 summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un provides an important test of China’s claim that it can help create a more stable alternative to the US-led international order. While the summit demonstrated China’s diplomatic influence and regional importance, it also exposed the difficulties Beijing faces in managing allies whose interests do not always align with its own.
The visit was carefully designed to showcase Chinese leadership. Xi received a lavish welcome in Pyongyang, complete with military ceremonies, mass performances and repeated references to the historic friendship between the two countries. Coming shortly after Xi had hosted both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Beijing, the summit reinforced China’s attempt to present itself as the central diplomatic actor in an increasingly multipolar world. Beijing was seeking to reassert influence over North Korea after Pyongyang’s growing partnership with Russia. Since North Korea began supporting Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, Moscow has provided economic assistance, diplomatic backing and potentially military technology. This has reduced Kim’s dependence on China and created a subtle rivalry between Beijing and Moscow for influence in Pyongyang. Xi’s visit can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to prevent North Korea drifting too far into Russia’s orbit and to remind Kim that China remains his country’s most important economic partner.
Beijing does not necessarily welcome all of Kim’s actions. China benefits from North Korea acting as a buffer state against US influence in East Asia, but it is also concerned that excessive North Korean militarisation could undermine regional stability. Kim’s continued expansion of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities risks strengthening security cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea – precisely the coalition China seeks to weaken. This creates an alliance management dilemma. Beijing wants North Korea strong enough to challenge US influence, but not so provocative that it pushes China’s rivals closer together.
The summit highlighted these tensions. Notably, neither side publicly discussed denuclearisation, despite North Korea continuing to expand its nuclear arsenal. Analysts suggested this reflected China’s growing acceptance that denuclearisation is no longer realistic. Yet Xi’s silence may also reveal the limits of Chinese influence. Beijing possesses significant economic leverage over North Korea, but it cannot simply dictate Kim’s behaviour. This demonstrates the importance of relational power. China’s influence depends not only on its economic and military capabilities but on its ability to shape the choices of other states. However, influence does not necessarily equal control. A useful comparison is the contemporary US-Israel relationship. The USA provides Israel with extensive military, economic and diplomatic support, yet Washington has repeatedly struggled to fully shape Israeli behaviour. Despite American concerns that regional escalation could destabilise the Middle East and undermine broader US objectives, Israel has continued military operations in Lebanon, including recent airstrikes in Tyre and southern Lebanon. This illustrates a wider reality of international politics: even the most powerful states cannot fully control strategically important partners whose own security interests may differ. Similarly, China remains North Korea’s principal economic lifeline, but Xi cannot simply order Kim to halt nuclear expansion or moderate his military policies.
Ultimately, the Xi-Kim summit reveals a paradox at the heart of China’s vision for a new world order. Beijing seeks to present itself as a stable and responsible global leader, yet stability depends on managing partners whose interests only partially align with its own. The summit suggests that China’s challenge is not building partnerships but managing them. Like the USA with Israel, China possesses significant influence over its ally but not complete control. This raises questions about whether any great power can truly lead a stable international order when even its closest partners retain substantial autonomy and have locally-destabilising effects.