3.1 – The state and globalisation
3.2 – Global governance: political and economic
3.4 – Power and developments
3.6 – Comparative theories
The ceasefire agreed in early April 2026 between Iran and the United States, mere hours before Trump had announced he would carry out his threat to obliterate Iranian civilisation, has marked not an end to the conflict, but a transition into a more complex phase characterised by indirect confrontation, economic coercion, and diplomatic uncertainty. While large-scale military engagement has subsided, the post-ceasefire period illustrates the enduring primacy of the state and the limits of international cooperation in a contested global system.
In the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire, attention shifted to the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery of global trade. Its brief reopening suggested a tentative move towards de-escalation; however, this proved short-lived. Iranian authorities subsequently restricted access, citing alleged violations of the ceasefire by the United States and its allies, particularly the continuation of maritime pressure through a naval blockade imposed against shipping to and from Iranian ports. The repeated reopening and reclosing of the strait demonstrates how strategic geography can be used by states to exert influence within an interdependent global economy. A bill is now reportedly in progress in the Iranian political system to make the system of Iranian control and tolls on the Strait a permanent feature of global trade.
The US’ naval blockade is a clear example of utilising hard power to achieve a state’s aims, while avoiding risky direct confrontation. This approach has avoided direct escalation while maintaining significant pressure on Iran’s economy and regional capabilities. The resulting situation has been described as a “war of blockades”, with both sides intercepting and seizing commercial vessels. Such developments highlight the continued relevance of hard power, albeit exercised through economic and maritime instruments rather than conventional warfare, in which control over trade flows has emerged as a key dimension of the contemporary conflict.
Efforts to move from ceasefire to negotiated settlement have, however, largely failed. Talks scheduled in Islamabad, facilitated by regional actors and Pakistan, have been repeatedly delayed. The core obstacle lies in the incompatibility of negotiating positions: the USA has prioritised freedom of navigation and constraints on Iranian regional activity, whereas Iran has demanded immediate and sweeping sanctions relief and recognition of its strategic position in the Middle East. These competing objectives have limited the prospects for compromise and highlight the difficulties in seeking solutions in a world characterised by Westphalian state sovereignty, where states (in the realist view) selfishly seek to maximise their own self-interest at the expense of other states.
The broader implications of the conflict underscore its global significance. Disruptions to energy flows through Hormuz have had tangible economic consequences, particularly for export-dependent economies such as China, where rising costs and uncertainty have affected production and trade. While the conflict has the potential to embroil the US in a long-term, expensive quagmire that could break the USA’s hegemonic status and benefit China; it seems equally possible that long-term disruption to Iranian oil exports could lead to serious difficulties in the Chinese economy and hamper its bid for superpower status.
Taken together, developments since the April ceasefire illustrate the tension between interdependence and sovereignty in contemporary global politics. Despite deep economic interconnectedness, states continue to prioritise national interest and strategic advantage. The persistence of coercive economic measures, the fragility of diplomatic efforts, and the limited effectiveness of mediation all point towards a system in which cooperation is constrained by self-interest.